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FOURTH AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND THEIR IMPACT UPON THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS IN INDIANA
By
F. Thomas Schornhorst
During its most recent term the Su-
preme Court of the United States
decided a number of important cases
affecting the scope of Fourth Amend-
ment limitations on state and federal
police power. The focus, as usual,
has been on whether certain evidence
seized by police from the accused
should be admitted against him as
evidence in a criminal trial. While
there has emerged no clear-cut prin-
ciple upon which future decisions
and predictions of future decisions
can be based (a condition that per-
vades the history of Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence), it does appear
that a majority of the Court is gear-
ing up either (1) to overrule Mapp v.
Ohio1 and thereby separate the Ex-
clusionary Rule from the Fourteenth
if not the Fourth Amendment;2 or
(2) by a process of careful case selec-
tion to confine narrowly the range of
situations in which Fourth Amend-
ment violations will be found and,
hence, the rule of exclusion of evi-
dence applied.
So far, it is the second judicial
technique that is being employed-
perhaps as a goal in itself or as a
means of forcing the abolition of the
Exclusionary Rule as each decision
designed to contain the rule thereby
constricts the scope of individual
rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The next three installments of
Criminal Law Notes will be devoted
to a brief analysis of these major
Fourth Amendment developments
and their impact upon the criminal
process in Indiana.
Search Incident to Traffic Arrests-
Robinson and Gustafson.
In United States v. Robinson3 and
Gustafson v. Florida,4 the Court, for
the first time, considered the ques-
tion of the permissible scope of a
search of a person 5 arrested for a
minor traffic offense.
Both Robinson and Gustafson
were lawfully stopped by police
while operating motor vehicles and
subsequently were arrested for fail-
ure to produce valid operator's per-
mits. 6 In each instance the arresting
officer planned to transport the ac-
cused to the stationhouse for booking
or further investigation 7 and pro-
ceeded to conduct a patdown search.
In Robinson the officer, standing
face-to-face with the suspect, felt an
object inside the left breast pocket of
his coat which, when removed by the
officer, turned out to be a crumpled
cigarette package. Feeling objects that
did not appear to be cigarettes in-
side, the officer opened the package
and discovered capsules of heroin.
Gustafson was searched in similar
fashion and a cigarette box was re-
moved from his pocket, immediately
opened and was found to contain
marijuana.
Both persons subsequently were
charged and convicted for unlawful
possession of drugs over their objec-
tions that the incriminating evidence
had been discovered as the result of
an unconstitutional search. Robin-
son's conviction was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia on the
ground that the search of his person
exceeded the constitutionally permis-
sible scope. The Supreme Court of
Florida, reversing an intermediate
appellate court decision in favor of
Gustafson, upheld the constitutional-
ity of the search.
The basic issue presented by these
cases was whether the scope of police
power to conduct a warrantless
search of a person incident to a law-
ful arrest is limited by the factors
that traditionally have been thought
to justify such searches as exceptions
to the general Fourth Amendment
rule requiring warrants. In other
words, may the search of the arrested
person extend beyond that necessary
to ascertain whether he is carrying
weapons that could pose a danger to
the officer or to others, or to prevent
the destruction of evidence related to
the crime or crimes for which the
arrest was effected?
The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of both searches and
in the process rejected arguments
that the validity of a particular
search be analyzed case by case in
light of the dual criteria of safety
and the need to preserve evidence:
The authority to search the person
incident to a lawful custodial ar-
rest, while based upon the need to
disarm and to discover evidence,
does not depend on what a court
may later decide was the prob-
ability in a particular arrest situa-
tion that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found upon the
person of the suspect. A custodial
arrest of a suspect based on prob-
able cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment;
that intrusion being lawful, a
search incident to the arrest re-
quires no additional justification.
It is the fact of the lawful arrest
which establishes the authority to
search, and we hold that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a
full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment, but is also a 'reasonable'
search under that Amendment. 8
In adopting this per se rule, the
Court obviated any need to inquire
in the specific cases (1) whether the
officers had any reason to fear for
their safety; (2) whether the warrant-
less inspection of the inside of the
cigarette containers constituted an
additional invasion of privacy for
which separate justification would
have to be shown; or (3) whether
there was any evidence of the offense
that conceivably could have been
destroyed.
(Continued on page 23)
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Throughout the majority opinions
the terms "full custody arrest" or
"custodial arrest" are employed to
describe the initial justification for
the searches. This is a term of art
new to Fourth Amendment decisions
and, in light of the facts of each case,
must be intended to describe those
cases in which, the arresting officer
subjects a suspect to significantly
greater restraint than, say, the mo-
mentary interference with freedom of
movement involved in the process
of issuing a traffic summons. While
the majority opinion offers no defini-
tion of "custodial arrest" it does
quote a District of Columbia police
witness' definition of a "full custody
arrest" as "one' where an officer
would arrest a subject and sub-
sequently transport him to a police
facility for booking....-9 Hence,
neither Robinson nor Gustafson can
be read as authorizing searches of
persons who may be lawfully stopped
by police for traffic or other minor
violations, but whx are allowed to
proceed after the issuance of a sum-
mons. This was an issue expressly
left undecided by the Court.'0
Indiana Applications
While at least one state supreme
court has found the minimal constitu-
tional standards articulated in Robin-
son/Gustafson inadequate under its
own state law," a majority of the
Indiana Supreme Court seems not
only to have embraced the holdings
in those cases, but to have extended
their application beyond the search
of the person and in a non-custodial
arrest situation at that.
In Frasier v. State 2 a deputy sheriff
at night stopped an automobile be-
cause of a noisy muffler. Shining his
flashlight inside the car, the deputy
spotted a "tire tool or pry bar" pro-
truding from a sack on the floorboard.
Suspecting the sack to contain bur-
glars' tools, the deputy ordered the
two occupants out of the car. He
then approached the two men to
request identification. One of them
drew a pistol. The deputy shot and
killed this man and captured the
other as he tried to escape. A subse-
quent search of the car revealed evi-
dence of an armed robbery which had
been committed only a short time
before. The deputy had no knowledge
of the robbery at the time he stopped
the car.
In seeking to suppress the evidence
of the armed robbery the defendant
invited the Court to join him far out
on a limb of the "poisoned tree"
arguing that the search of the sack
was unlawful, and that the gunfight
and the post-gunfight search of the
car were its illicit fruits. While the
Court would seem to have had little
difficulty sawing this one off,' 3 it chose
instead to insist that Robinson and
Gustafson controlled, and upheld not
only the admission of the armed rob-
bery evidence, but the contents of the
sack as well.
Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Arterburn observed that since
driving with a defective muffler is a
misdemeanor, the deputy had a right
to arrest the driver for an offense com-
mitted in his presence. "Acting with-
in this authority, the Deputy asked
for identification. Since he had the
right to make an arrest and a search
incident thereto, he had the right to
make the considerably lesser intrusion
of a request for identification. The
ensuing assault on the Deputy vali-
dates the subsequent search of the car
and the seizure of the items there-
in."14
This is the extent of the majority's
discussion of the impact of Robinson
and Gustafson! As pointed out by
Justice DeBruler in dissent, the ma-
jority opinion glosses over two im-
portant factors: (1) the initial arrest
was not "custodial;" (2) the initial
search was not of the arrested person,
but of a sack taken from a car. While
the language of the Chief Justice
quoted above serves to explain the
basis for the admission of the evidence
found after the shootout, it hardly
justifies the bending of Robinson and
Gustafson to sustain the admissibility
of the contents of the sack.
Whether an officer is authorized to
take a traffic offender into custody
depends upon the application of two
sections of the Uniform Traffic Act,
neither of which was mentioned by
the Frasier majority.
IC 1971, 9-4-1-130 requires police
officers immediately to bring before
a magistrate any person arrested for
a traffic misdemeanor when any of the
following situations obtain: (I) the
person demands such an appearance;
(2) the offense involves personal in-
jury or death; (3) the charge is reck-
less homicide; (4) the charge is driv-
ing under the influence of liquor or
narcotics; (5) the charge is failure to
stop after involvement in an accident
causing personal injury or property
damage; or (6) the arrestee refuses to
give a written promise to appear in
court pursuant to summons. While
these situations will not necessarily
involve a trip to the police station, it
would seem that the power exercised
over the person necessary to transport
him to a magistrate could be con-
sidered a "custodial arrest."
On the other hand, an Indiana
resident arrested for a traffic misde-
meanor and who does not fall within
any of the preceding categories must,
according to the Attorney General's
interpretation of IC 1971, 9-4-1-131,15
be released after being issued a sum-
mons to appear in court and after
signing a promise to appear. A cus-
todial arrest would not have taken
place in such a situation.
As to the search of the sack found
inside the car, the majority failed
to deal with its own previously stated
position in Paxton v. State.16 In the
context of a search of an automobile
incident to a traffic arrest the Court
there observed: "[I]t would seem clear
that the mere fact of an arrest by
itself, would not necessarily justify
a warrantless search incidental there-
to. . . . [TJhe reasonableness of a
warrantless search incident to an
arrest in terms of both its initiation
and scope must be determined from
the inherent necessities of the circum-
stances surrounding the arrest."'17
(Con tinued on page 30)
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NECESSITY TO REORGANIZE
FOR GROUP PRACTICE
(Continued from page 29)
applicable to or deferred to in his agreement.
Annually during the month of January and
not later than January 31 he shall advise the
State Bar, on forms provided by it, of any
changes in such matters and the number of
persons to whom he rendered legal services
during the preceding calendar year pursuant
to the arrangement. Information supplied
hereunder shall be available to the public on
request and whether or not such information
is also supplied pursuant to Rule 20 hereof.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this
section, the group or nonprofit organization
may file with the State Bar any report re-
quired of the member under this section,
but the member shall be responsible for
any errors or omissions in any such report.
EXHIBIT B
EXACT COPY OF RULE 20 OF RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA
RULE 20. The furnishing of legal serv-
ices by a member of the State Bar pursuant
to an arrangement for the provision of such
services to the individual member of a group,
as herein defined, at the request of such
group, is not of itself in violation of Rules 2
or 3 of these Rules of Professional Conduct
if the arrangement:
1. permits any member of the group to ob-
tain legal services independently of the
arrangement from any attorney of his
choice,
2. is so administered and operated as to pre-
vent
(a) such group, its agents or any member
thereof from interfering with or con-
trolling the performance of the duties
of such member of the State Bar to
his client,
(b) such group, its agents or any member
thereof from directly or indirectly de-
riving a profit from or receiving any
part of the consideration paid to the
member of the State Bar for the ren-
dering of legal services thereunder,
(c) unlicensed persons from practicing
thereunder, and
(d) all publicizing and soliciting activities
concerning the arrangement except by
means of simple, dignified announce-
ments setting forth the purposes and
activities of the group or the nature
and extent of the legal services or
both, without any identification of the
member or members of the State Bar
rendering or to render such services.
Nothing in this rule shall prohibit a state-
ment in response to individual inquiries as to
the identity of the member or members of
the State Bar rendering or to render the serv-
ices giving the name or names, addresses and
telephone numbers of such member or mem-
bers.
As used in this rule a group means a pro-
fessional association, trade association, labor
union or other non-profit organization or
combination of persons, incorporated or
otherwise, whose primary purposes and ac-
tivities are other than the rendering of legal
services.
A member of the State Bar furnishing legal
services pursuant to an arrangement for the
provision thereof shall advise the State Bar
thereof within 60 days after entering into the
same. Thereafter he shall advise the State
Bar, on forms provided by it, of the follow-
ing matters: the name of the group, its ad-
dress, whether it is incorporated, its pri-
iiary purposes and activities, the number of
its members and a general description of the
types of legal services offered pursuant to the
arrangement. Annually on January 31, he
shall report to the State Bar, on forms pro-
vided by it, any changes in such matters, and
the number of members of the group to
whom legal services were rendered during the
calendar year. Each report file pursuant
hereto and the information contained there-
in, except the name and address of the group,
the fact that it has an arrangement for the
provision of legal services and the names of
members of the State Bar providing such
services shall be confidential.
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I share Justice DeBruler's concern
that Frasier will be read to allow "a
full scale search of anyone who vio-
lates some traffic regulation, [and]
invites wholesale and groundless in-
trusions upon the personal privacy of
thousands of Indiana motorists."' 8
The Indiana Supreme Court's un-
reasoned extension of Robinson and
Gustafson appears to validate the
worst fears of those of us who feel
that the Fourth Amendment is be-
coming dangerously undermined.
1367 U.S. 463 (1961).
This depends upon whether the Court con-
tinues to employ the doctrine of selective incor-
poration with respect to the application of the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the
States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or whether the Court
moves to re-examine the basic relationships within
our federal system with regard to matters of
criminal procedure. One the other hand, the
Court may return to the pre-Mapp position that
the sanction of exclusion is not necessarily part of
the fundamental guarantee of freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures except in the
most egregious circumstances. Cf. Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
'414 U.S. 218 (1973).
4414 U.S. 260 (1973).
' Neither case involved the question of a
search of the arrested person's automobile inci-
dent to a traffic arrest. The scope of such a
search would, at the very least, be governed by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which
held that incident to an arrest "[tihere is ample
justification . . . for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate con-
trol'-construing that phrase to mean the area
from which he might gain possession of a wea-
pon or destructible evidence." See also Paxton v.
State, 255 Ind. 264, 263 N.E.2d 636 (1970).
'Robinson was arrested for driving after a sus-
pension of his permit while Gustafson's arrest was
based on his failure to have his operator's permit
in his possession.
' In Robinson this decision was pursuant to a
District of Columbia police departmental directive,
and in Gustafson the Florida policeman apparently
had discretionary power to take the suspect into
custody.
s414 U.S. at 235.
p414 U.S. at 221n2.
'0 414 U.S. at 236n6.
" State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51 (Hawaii 1974).
" No. 873 S 149, S.Ct. Ind., June 4, 1974.
See also Sizemore v. State, 308 N.E.2d 400 (Ind.
App. 1974).
13 First, the assault on the officer would seem
to have provided an independent basis far the
search of the car despite the alleged illegality of
the search of the sack. Moreover, the State had
a plausible argument that the seizure and inspec-
tion of the sack was a reasonable self-protective
move on the part of the officer.
14 Supra note 12 at p. 4.
15 1961 Op. Ind. Att'y Gen. 83; 1969 Op. Ind.
Att'y Gen. 124.
"°255 Ind. 264, 263 N.E.2d 636 (1970).
17 Id. at 639, 640.
' Supra note 12 at p. 3 (dissenting opinion).
LAW SCHOOL GIVEN
FUNDS TO TRAIN
ADMINISTRATORS FOR
COURTS OF INDIANA
A program to train and certify ad-
ministrative personnel for Indiana
courts is being prepared at Indiana
University Indianapolis Law School.
The program initially will be
funded by a grant of $75,000 awarded
the law school for that purpose by
the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration.
The program, in cooperation with
the Indiana Center for Judicial Edu-
cation, is designed to furnish Indiana
courts with personnel equipped to
assist the judges in reducing court de-
lays through improvement of case
control and to upgrade court budget-
ing and other fiscal affairs.
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